And Lettuce is Nonanimal: Toward A Positive Theory of Voluntary Action by Lohmann, Roger A.
Faculty Scholarship 
4-25-2020 
And Lettuce is Nonanimal: Toward A Positive Theory of Voluntary 
Action 
Roger A. Lohmann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Arts Management Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, Nonprofit 
Administration and Management Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration 
Commons, Public Administration Commons, Recreation, Parks and Tourism Administration Commons, 
Social Welfare Commons, Social Work Commons, Theory, Knowledge and Science Commons, and the 
Urban Studies Commons 
. . .And Lettuce is Nonanimal. . . Toward a Positive Theory of 
Voluntary Action1 
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D. 
West Virginia University	
	
Negative Theory Existing	economic	and	financial	theories	of	nonprofit	organizations	are	based	in	an	extensive	and	rather	remarkable	set	of	negations	and	negative	comparisons	of	voluntary	action	with	the	market,	or	for-profit	sector.	Ironically,	these	negations	tell	us	far	more	about	what	the	nonprofit	sector	is	not	than	they	do	about	what	it	is.	They	also	begin	rather	consistently	from	the	charming,	but	completely	unwarranted,	assumption	that	all	nonprofit	activity	is	somehow	a	deviant	form	of	commercial	enterprise.	As	a	result,	the	professed	intent	of	recent	nonprofit	economic	theory	to	be	useful	to	those	with	a	substantive	interest	in	voluntary	action	(Rose-Ackerman,	p.15)	falls	far	short	of	the	mark.	The	intent	of	this	article	is	to	stimulate	further	debate	among	market-oriented	economists,	voluntary	sector	management	theorists	and	others	over	more	appropriate	models	of	resource	allocation	and	decision-making	in	the	voluntary	sector.	A	suitable	beginning	point	for	this	discussion	is	the	remarkably	negative	tone	of	existing	nonprofit	economics,	and	associated	work	in	accounting	and	management	science.		Anthony	and	Young	define	a	nonprofit	organization	as	one	"whose	goal	is	something	
other	than	earning	a	profit	for	its	owners".	They	also	identify	the	absence	of	a	profit	measure	and	inadequate	management	controls	among	a	list	of	characteristics	which	identify	nonprofit	organizations.	(1984,	p.	38)	Anthony	and	Young,	along	with	many	others	also	view	nonprofit	organization	as	inherently	inefficient	due	to	the	lack	of	profit	
motivation	and	resulting	inadequate	management	controls.	(Anthony	and	Young,1984;	Steinberg,	1987,	p.	134;	Zaltman,	1979).	Hansmann	finds	the	basis	of	an	economic	model	of	nonprofit	action	in	a	phenomenon	he	terms	contract	failure	(1980,	1987).	Baumol	and	Bowen	(1966)	argue	that	the	performing	arts	face	an	ever	widening	income-earnings	gap	because	of	their	inability	to	increase	productivity	via	technological	change	(1968).	Sugden	argues	that	"the	voluntary	sector	differs	from	the	profit-making	sector	in	that	exclusion	is	
not	practiced....(because)	a	person	has	contributed	towards	the	costs	(of	a	nonprofit	service)	does	not	give	him	any	entitlement	or	priority"	(1984,	p.	772).	Weisbrod	(1977)	places	the	negative	accent	not	in	the	nonprofit	sector	itself,	but	in	the	public	sector.	Nonprofit	action,	he	argues,	tends	to	serve	a	gap-filling	role	vis-à-vis	governmental	enterprise,	meeting	demands	for	public	services	left	unmet	by	government	provision.	The	
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first	two	sections	of	a	recent	book	on	nonprofit	economics	are	entitled	"Government	Failure"	and	"Contract	Failure"	(Rose-Ackerman,	1986).	Others	have	suggested	that	such	organizations	are	non-governmental	in	nature.	Virtually	all	existing	nonprofit	management	theories	explicitly	or	implicitly	begin	from	this	kind	of	negative	accent	and	contribute	to	the	paradoxical	consensus	position	that	nonprofits	action	has	no	independent	basis.	Nonprofit	organizations	(and	voluntary	action)	arise	only	from	the	failures	of	other	institutions,	but	are	themselves	inefficient,	unproductive,	poorly	managed,	mismanaged	and	inadequately	controlled.	The	resulting	stigmatization	of	nonprofit	and	voluntary	action	–	widely	shared	among	American	business	and	political	leaders	for	much	of	this	century	–	has	many	far-reaching	policy	consequences,	including	some	distinctly	quirky	conclusions.	For	example,	in	the	current	Small	Business	Administration	campaign	against	nonprofits,	the	tax-exempt	status	of	nonprofit	organizations	is	being	challenged	on	grounds	that	nonprofits	have	"an	unfair	competitive	advantage."	(Washington	Social	Legislation	Bulletin,	1985.)	Unfair	competition,	it	would	seem	arising	from	inefficient,	unproductive,	poorly	managed	sources!	The	remarkable	negative	(and	paradoxical)	accent	of	literature	concentrating	on	the	economics	and	management	of	nonprofits	is	in	marked	contrast	to	the	positive	statements	of	most	other,	noneconomic,	sources	dealing	with	the	voluntary	sector.	Philanthropy	is	a	tradition	reaching	back	millennia	to	the	ancient	Greeks.	In	another	historical	perspective	on	nonprofit	activity,	Hall	identifies	the	nonprofit	sector	as	a	distinctive	product	of	democracy	and	capitalism.	(Hall,	1987,3).	In	a	political	analysis	of	nonprofits,	Douglas	(1987,	47)	notes	that	"the	classic	pluralist	argument	is	that	a	voluntary	nonprofit	sector	permits	a	greater	diversity	of	social	provisions	than	the	state	itself	can	provide."	Simon	(1987,	68)	in	reviewing	the	legal	issues	of	tax-exempt	status,	says	that	"the	nonprofit	sector	is	subject	to	special	treatment	under	federal	individual	and	corporate	income	taxes,	estate	and	gift	taxes	and	certain	excise	taxes."	Each	of	these	authors,	like	the	majority	of	the	forty	five	articles	in	the	O'Connell	(1983)	volume	are	saying	positive	things	about	the	social,	economic	and	legal	posture	of	nonprofit	organizations	without	any	overtones	of	failure,	incompleteness,	mismanagement	and	inadequacy	which	characterize	the	economic	literature.		An	important	question	which	arises,	therefore,	is	why	the	economic	treatment	of	voluntary	action	is	so	uniformly	and	distinctly	negative.	One	possibility,	of	course,	would	be	simply	to	point	to	a	theoretical	bias	against	nonprofit	action	by	economists,	accountants,	management	scientists	and	business	leaders	–	a	simple	preference	for	market	and	profit-oriented	activity	or	a	distaste	for	nonprofit	and	philanthropic	ventures.	Such	a	possibility	should	not	be	easily	discounted.	In	general,	however,	negation	does	not	offer	a	sound	starting	point	for	theory	and	scientific	study	of	nonprofit	organization	and	voluntary	action.	
A Classification Anomaly An	equally	plausible	explanation	is	that	all	this	negativism	results	from	the	failure	of	existing	economic	theory	to	adequately	explain	noncommercial	and	nongovernmental	voluntary	action.	The	very	concept	of	'nonprofit'	(or	'not-for-profit')	activity	as	a	unit	of	analysis	may	well	be	a	classification	anomaly	resulting	from	the	observable	existence	of	
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actual,	empirical	voluntary	action	outside	the	range	of	concepts	covered	by	existing	economic	and	financial	theories.	Thus,	the	term	nonprofit	functions	as	a	linguistic	marker	for	various	rhetorical	extensions	and	clever	analogies	with	which	to	bring	these	phenomena	back	within	theoretical	range	of	established	economic	theory.	Such	restoration	efforts,	while	interesting	from	the	vantage	point	of	existing	theory,	do	remarkably	little	to	adequately	describe	or	explain	the	basis	of	rational	choice	in	voluntary	action.	While	various	reasons	have	been	advanced	for	this,	one	very	real	possibility	is	that	existing	economic	concepts	are	insufficient	to	the	task,	thus	necessitating	those	remarkable	negations.	We	can	produce	roughly	the	same	result	by	classifying	lettuce	as	a	mammal.	Lettuce,	by	this	logic,	is	a	non-fur	bearing,	non-milk	producing,	non-child	bearing,	non-warm-blooded	non-animal.	Further,	as	a	mammal,	lettuce	is	highly	ineffective,	being	sedentary	and	not	warm-blooded.	All	other	mammals	are	much	faster!	Lettuce	is	also	remarkable	nonagile,	and	not	protective	of	its	young.	On	the	whole,	lettuce	is	a	miserable	excuse	for	a	mammal!	In	a	similar	way,	nonprofit	action	has	increasingly	been	misclassified	as	a	very	deficient	form	of	commercial	enterprise.	The	full	burden	of	this	classification	anomaly	forces	us	to	equate	formally	organized	nonprofit	services	for	the	homeless,	community	orchestras	or	intercollegiate	lacrosse	and	rugby	competitions	with	completely	unrelated	commercial	ventures	like	manufacturing	shoes	or	selling	automobiles.	In	the	process,	the	very	nature	of	nonprofit	action	is	transformed	and	distorted	solely	in	order	to	make	it	more	easily	fit	existing	theory.		Finding	reasons	for	this	misclassification	is	not	difficult.	First	of	all,	some	types	of	contemporary	American	'nonprofit'	services	do	look	and	act	a	good	deal	like	commercial	ventures,	and	the	current	trend	appears	to	be	for	some	of	them	to	move	even	further	in	that	direction	in	the	future.	Because	there	is	a	marked	tendency	in	current	nonprofit	economics	to	concentrate	on	hospitals,	nursing	homes,	fee-based	social	services	and	other	quasi-commercial	enterprises,	this	perspective	is	easily	sustained.	We	are	in	danger	of	forgetting,	however,	that	a	very	large	portion	of	voluntary	action	does	not	look	or	act	anything	like	commercial	enterprise,	and	nonprofit	economics	has	been	virtually	mute	on	these	efforts.	Clues	that	nonprofit	organizations	are	actually	of	at	least	two	basic	types	are	scattered	throughout	the	existing	literature.	Hansmann,	for	example,	differentiates	mutual,	entrepreneurial,	donative	and	commercial	types.	(Hansmann,	1980)	In	a	similar	vein,	Anthony	distinguishes	between	"Type	A"	nonprofits	which	rely	on	revenues	(Hansmann’s		entrepreneurial	and	commercial	types),	and	"Type	B"	nonprofits	(the	mutual	and	donative	types)	which	do	not	(Anthony,	1978,	8-10).	We	can	label	the	first	of	these	nonprofit	firms.	Mutual	and	donative	nonprofits	will	receive	further	attention	below.	In	the	remainder	of	this	discussion,	we	will	be	concerned	entirely	with	noncommercial	and	nonentrepreneurial	nonprofit	activities	(Hansman's	donative-mutual	cell	and	Anthony's	Type	B).	For	reasons	of	parsimony,	we	can	call	Type	B,	donative-mutual	economic	action	"voluntary	action".	There	is	good	reason	within	economic	theory	itself	for	believing	that	voluntary	action	falls	outside	conventional	economic	theory:	In	one	of	the	fundamental	formative	documents	of	economic	theory,	for	example,	Adam	Smith	classified	many	common	activities	which	we	today	call	voluntary	as	"unproductive"	and	set	them	entirely,	and	
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perhaps	permanently,	outside	the	bounds	of	economics.	For	most	of	the	next	two	centuries,	Smith’s	concept	resulted	in	economists	viewing	such	activities	as	consumption	rather	than	productive	activity.	The	theoretical	basis	of	such	perspectives	is	itself	one	more	negation:	Smith's	concept	of	'unproductive	labor'.	In	The	Wealth	of	Nations,	Smith	argued	that:	"There	is	one	sort	of	labor	which	adds	to	the	value	of	the	subject	upon	which	it	is	bestowed;	there	is	another	which	has	no	such	effect.	The	former,	as	it	produces	a	value,	may	be	called	productive;	the	latter,	unproductive	labor.	Thus	the	labor	of	a	manufacturer	adds,	generally,	to	the	value	of	the	materials	which	he	works	upon,	that	of	his	own	maintenance,	and	of	his	master's	profit.	The	labor	of	a	menial	servant,	on	the	contrary	adds	to	the	value	of	nothing.	Though	the	manufacturer	has	his	wages	advanced	to	him	by	his	master,	he,	in	reality,	costs	him	no	expense,	the	value	of	his	wages	generally	being	restored,	together	with	a	profit,	in	the	improved	value	of	the	subject	upon	which	the	labor	was	bestowed.	A	man	grows	rich	by	employing	a	multitude	of	manufacturers;	he	grows	poor	by	maintaining	a	multitude	of	menial	servants."	(p.	430)	Mainstream	economics	continued	to	hold	to	Smith’s	position	for	most	of	the	next	two	centuries.	Neoclassical	economic	theorists	eventually	rejected	Smith’s	concept	of	unproductive	labor	and	nonprofit	economists	are	in	the	process	of	identifying	distinctive	models	of	nonprofit	organization	as	production.	Nonetheless,	calling	attention	to	Smith’s	concept	is	important	both	because	of	its	long	duration	and	because	of	its	apparent	role	in	making	the	case	for	state	nonprofit	corporation	statutes	and	in	the	computation	of	the	national	accounts:	Nonprofit	corporations	were	held	to	be	tax-exempt	because	their	activities	represented	consumption	rather	than	production.	For	decades,	the	U.S.	Department	of	Commerce	classified	trackable	nonprofit	activity	as	consumption	in	the	national	accounts,	and	acknowledged	that	many	other	types	of	voluntary	action	(especially	those	under	consideration	here)	are	not	measured	in	national	income	(U.S.	Dept.	of	Commerce,	1981).	The	view	that	voluntary	action	consumes	rather	than	creates	economic	value	was	reinforced	when	Smith	noted,	"Unproductive	laborers,	and	those	who	do	not	labour	at	all,	are	all	maintained	by	revenue;	either,	first,	by	that	part	of	the	annual	produce	which	is	originally	destined	for	constituting	a	revenue	to	some	particular	persons,	either	as	the	rent	of	land	or	as	the	profits	of	stock;	or	secondly,	by	that	part	which,	though	originally	destined	for	replacing	a	capital	and	for	maintaining	productive	labourers	only,	yet	when	it	comes	into	their	hands	whatever	part	of	it	is	over	and	above	their	necessary	subsistence	may	be	employed	indifferently	in	maintaining	either	productive	or	unproductive	hands."	(p.	432)	Elsewhere,	Smith	notes,	voluntary	action	was	deemed	to	be	most	like	household	service.	The	entire	economics	of	common	goods	is	subsumed	within	that	part	which	is	"over	and	above"	subsistence	and	a	matter	of	indifference.	The	indifference	of	economic	theory	is	well	documented.	A	brief	check	on	the	economic	theory	shelves	in	any	library	will	confirm	that	terms	such	as	nonprofit,	voluntary,	gifts,	charity,	philanthropy	and	even	services	occur	rarely	and	peripherally	in	economic	theory	texts.	Voluntary	action,	it	would	seem,	was	written	out	of	the	economic	corpus	at	the	beginning,	and	has,	at	best,	only	recently	sneaked	back	into	the	farthest,	least	well	lit,	corners.	And,	perhaps	as	a	price	for	readmission,	the	main	body	of	voluntary	action	has	remained	beyond	the	analytical	limits	of	economic	
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theory.	Highly	visible	and	costly	"nonprofit"	activities,	such	as	large	scale	health	care	services	and	"big	time"	intercollegiate	football	and	basketball,	do	not	constitute	the	core	of	America’s	voluntary	sector,	but	rather	constitute	a	kind	of	hybrid	activity,	operating	on	the	margins	of	the	marketplace.	The	core	of	voluntary	action	is	to	be	found	in	the	myriad	activities	of	religious,	philosophical	and	scientific,	charitable,	artistic	and	athletic	associations	whose	members	act	jointly	without	consideration	of	personal	or	collective	profit	in	any	economically	meaningful	sense.	Most	such	activity	is	not	monetized.	One	essential	task	of	a	"nonprofit"	economics	of	voluntary	action,	or	common	goods	economics,	should	be	to	account	for	these	core	activities.		Important	questions	can	be	raised	about	whether	such	an	economics	of	voluntary	action	is	even	possible.	Smith	appeared	to	believe	not.	Yet,	if	by	economics	one	means	formal	and	logical	analysis	of	rational	collective	action,	certainly	the	answer	would	appear	to	be	yes.	If,	by	economics	one	means	the	wholesale	application	of	abstract	mathematical	equations	and	models	to	empirical	problems	encountered	in	voluntary	action	situations,	based	on	rather	loose	analogies	and	metaphors,	the	answer	certainly	appears	to	be	yes.	If,	however,	one	seeks	after	fundamental	and	consistent	explanations	of	rational	allocative	choice	in	voluntary	action,	or	the	contribution	of	voluntary	action	to	the	national	wealth,	the	picture	is	considerably	less	clear.	The	technology	of	contemporary	economic	analysis	is	very	powerful.	Whether	the	results	of	those	applications	have	any	meaning	except	as	logical	exercises,	however,	is	another	question	entirely.		Equally	unclear	is	whether	a	“nonprofit	economics”	of	voluntary	action	must	be	grounded	in	philosophical	utilitarianism	and	specifically	the	concept	of	utility.	It	would	appear	that	distinct	economic	criteria	may	be	implicit	in	virtually	every	major	philosophy,	belief	system,	scientific	discipline	or	other	"thought	system"	and	way	of	life	represented	in	the	nonprofit	world.	These	would	seem	to	represent	alternative	evaluative	systems,	at	least	as	well-grounded	as	the	utilitarian	concepts	of	economic	theory.	There	is	nothing	especially	rational	about	the	value	commitment	that	adherents	of	diverse	schools	of	thought	must	adhere	to	the	logic	and	standards	of	19th	century	English	utilitarians	as	the	price	of	access	to	and	use	of	economic	resources	in	what	are	otherwise	considered	free,	unconstrained	and	self-governing	institutions.	The	preferred	approach	of	a	genuine	nonprofit	economics	should	allow	for	the	intrinsic	establishment	of	group	standards	or	"minimally	satisfactory	alternatives"	rather	than	the	universal	imposition	of	utility	maximization	as	a	universal	criterion.		Viewed	in	this	way,	there	is	something	decidedly	ironic,	if	not	downright	disingenuous,	about	the	negations	of	nonprofit	theory.	Charges	of	inefficiency	and	lack	of	productivity	seem	particularly	ironic,	given	the	traditional	placement	of	many	types	of	nonprofits	entirely	outside	the	bounds	of	economic	production.		
Toward Positive Theory: An Alternative Approach The	main	thrust	of	this	article	is	devoted	to	a	number	of	speculative	comments	about	the	nature	of	a	new	economics	of	voluntary	action,	with	particular	emphasis	on	"Type	B"	mutual	and	donative	associations,	societies,	congregations,	groups	and	other	similar	forms	of	collectivities.	What	follows	is	an	effort	to	address	in	an	affirmative	manner	such	questions	as:	What	is	the	nature	of	economic	action	"outside"	the	market,	the	household	
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and	the	state?	(It	has	already	been	established	what	it	is	not.)	What	is	that	something	other	than	earning	a	profit	which	energizes	those	who	operate	in	the	voluntary	sector	or	commons?	Are	there	any	recognizable	rational	economic	criteria	employed	by	voluntary	sector	actors	who	frankly	acknowledge	the	absence	or	inappropriateness	of	measures	such	as	profit	maximization,	Pareto	optimality	and	efficiency?	The	perspective	set	forth	here	is	termed	common	goods	economics,	or	endowment	theory.	It	is	deeply	grounded	in	philosophical	pragmatism	and	sociological	interactionism:	The	writings	of	C.S.	Pierce,	W.	James,	J.	Dewey,	G.H.	Mead,	W.I.	Thomas,	H.	Blumer,	K.	Burke,	H.S.	Sullivan,	et.	al.,	have	contributed	importantly	to	it.	However,	none	of	these	sources	ever	attempted,	or	so	far	as	is	known,	contemplated	an	economics	of	voluntary	action.	Thus,	rather	than	clutter	the	text	with	additional	references	to	works	which	are	discussed	in	standard	social	theory	texts,	the	interested	reader	unfamiliar	with	these	authors	should	consult	such	texts.	Martindale	(1960)	is	still	an	excellent	introduction	to	most	of	the	relevant	issues,	despite	its	age.		
An Economics of Common Goods The	first	task	must	be	to	establish	some	suitable	nomenclature.	As	a	fundamental	term,	nonprofit	is	inadequate,	although	not	noticeably	more	so	than	such	old	saws	as	"charity",	"philanthropy"	or	even	"eleemosynary".	In	the	following	discussion,	the	term	commons	will	be	used	to	signify	the	economic	dimensions	of	a	large	and	diverse	set	of	voluntary	collective	action	by	service	clubs,	artistic,	scientific	and	amateur	athletic	societies,	social	and	political	movements,	religious	and	philosophical	groups,	and	others	which	form	the	core	of	the	voluntary	sector	in	American	and	other	cultures.		In	all	known	human	cultures,	self-defining	and	self-governing	collectivities	of	voluntarily	associating	individuals	operate	collectively	and	independently	outside	of	markets,	households	and	the	state	in	social	spaces	which	can	be	called	commons.	There	they	pursue	mutually	agreed-upon	purposes	along	joint	lines	of	action	and	on	the	basis	of	economic	criteria	unique	and	intrinsic	to	the	commons.	From	an	economic	perspective	and	regardless	of	whether	they	can	be	monetized,	those	mutual	purposes	constitute	common	goods.	An	economic	common	and	associated	common	goods	arise	whenever	an	association	or	group	is	formed	or	an	assembly	is	gather	together,	simply	because	it	is	a	virtual	impossibility	that	any	collective	action	can	or	will	occur	without	resort	to	money	or	other	economic	resources.	Commons	are	not	unique	to	American	culture	or	the	present	century,	although	they	probably	exist	in	relatively	greater	abundance	today	than	at	other	times	in	history,	due	both	to	the	combined	effects	of	economic	affluence	and	political	freedom.	A	number	of	commons,	including	Plato's	Academy	and	the	other	Athenian	philosophy	schools,	the	Oracle	at	Delphi,	the	Temple	at	Jerusalem,	the	Library	of	Alexandria,	the	great	medieval	monasteries,	universities	and	hospitals	have	played	critical	roles	in	the	preservation	and	advancement	of	Western	civilization	and	values.	Similarly	important	nonwestern	commons	can	also	be	identified,	which	perform	analogous	roles	in	other	cultures,	including	along	with	hundreds	of	other	possible	examples,	Islamic	mosques	and	charitable	institutions	of	zakat,	Indian	ashrams,	Hindu	and	Buddhist	temples,	Central	American	Fiestas	and	various	practices	of	folk	medicine	throughout	the	world.	In	the	time	since	this	article	was	first	published,	the	temple	complex	at	Gobeckli	Tepi	in	Turkey,	built	nearly	11,000	years	ago,	appears	to	be	the	world’s	oldest	
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example	of	such	a	common.	James	(1987)	is	one	of	the	few	attempts	in	the	economic	literature	to	encompass	such	diverse	phenomena	within	the	traditional	production	metaphor.	The	economic	objective	and	result	of	collective	action	in	commons	is	the	production	of	common	goods,	which	may	include	such	things	as	new	knowledge,	religious	worship,	contemplation,	scientific	inquiry,	helping	and	charity,	artistic	expression,	play	and	many	other	desirable	projects	of	voluntary	action	groups.	Such	common	goods	are	easily	and	readily	distinguished	both	from	market	commodities	and	public	goods.	Exclusion	is	often	possible	with	common	goods,	and	they	are,	therefore,	unlike	public	goods.	However,	since	both	the	costs	and	benefits	of	common	goods	accrue	to	pluralities	without	division,	they	are	not	private	goods	either.	Further,	because	they	do	not	involve	large	numbers	of	buyers	and	sellers	and	any	known	or	recognizable	price	mechanism,	they	cannot	be	considered	market	goods	without	resort	to	extraordinary	theoretical	devices	or	deus	ex	machina.	Figure	1	below	is	an	adaptation	by	Vincent	and	Elinor	Ostrom	(1978)	of	the	conventional	economic	distinctions	of	public	and	private	goods,	differentiated	by	the	characteristics	of	exclusion	and	what	they	call	“subtractability”.	It	is	hypothesized	here	that	what	the	Ostroms	call	common	goods	corresponds	closely	with	what	Anthony	labeled	Type	B	nonprofits	and	Hansmann’s	donative	and	mutual	types	and	what	they	call	toll	goods	correspond	with	Anthony’s	Type	A	nonprofits	and	Hansmann’s	entrepreneurial	and	commercial	nonprofits.			
Figure 1 
Public, Private, Toll and Common Goods 
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Ostrom & Ostrom, 1977. 	Common	goods	and	toll	goods	are	best	viewed	as	entirely	separate	categories	of	economic	goods,	each	with	their	own	unique	characteristics.	One	of	the	most	intriguing	traits	of	common	goods,	for	example,	is	the	two-way	transformation	of	economic	values	(money	and	commodities)	into	non-economic	values	(religious,	philosophical,	scientific,	artistic,	charitable,	meanings)	and	back	again.	This	process	is	frequently	mislabeled	"nonprofit	production"	in	contemporary	theory,	but	bears	little	economic	similarity	to	the	economic	production	of	toll	goods	for	fee-paying	health	and	human	services	clients.	Perhaps	the	most	universal,	clearly	observable	and	easily	understandable	case	of	this	involves	the	transformation	of	gold,	other	precious	metals	and	gems	and	even	ordinary	objects	into	religious	icons	and	sacred	objects.	Such	objects	can	be	transformed	back	into	marketable	commodities	but	only	by	destroying	their	value	as	common	goods.	In	some	
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cases,	the	"consumption",	or	extinction	of	economic	value	which	occurs	is	complete,	as	in	the	burning	of	incense.	Such	transformations	are	often	reversable,	however,	as	conquerors	and	ordinary	thieves	throughout	the	ages	have	proven	by	restoring	the	market	value	to	these	objects.	The	20th	century	marketization	of	religious	art	from	many	cultures	offers	one	of	the	less	destructive	forms	of	such	reversal,	as	"priceless"	masterpieces	are,	in	fact,	priced	and	sold	at	auction.	In	late	1988,	for	example,	Hereford	Cathedral	in	England	was	reported	to	be	considering	the	sale	of	a	"priceless"	medieval	artifact,	de	Mappa	Munde,	to	finance	cathedral	operations.	A	huge	public	outcry	eventually	brought	substantial	donations	and	the	proposed	sale	was	withdrawn	and	the	non-economic	value	of	the	map	as	a	common	good	was	retained.		As	in	this	case,	such	transformations	are	not	the	central	economic	facts	of	the	commons,	but	only	to	the	interaction	of	commons	and	markets.	The	central	economic	facts	of	the	commons	are	episodes	of	communicative	interaction.	The	reason	this	is	so	is	quite	simple:	Services	are	primarily	social	acts	and	not	physical	objects.	Those	philosophers	and	social	scientists	who	have	studied	acts	generally	agree	that	such	acts	involve	communication.	This	is	one	of	the	key	departures	of	twentieth	century	American	social	science	from	nineteenth	century	materialism,	and	one	to	which	an	economics	of	voluntary	action	must	accommodate.		Although	there	is	no	fully	satisfactory	term	for	the	economic	aspects	of	this	communication	process	we	might	refer	to	it	as	discretion	(as	in	"discretionary	grants"	or	"discretionary	purchases").	In	any	case,	discretion	may	be	the	preferable	term	when	addressing	the	choice	and	decision	aspects	of	acts	of	common	good.	For	a	host	of	theoretical	and	practical	reasons,	the	term	coproduction		In	the	1989	version	of	this	article	the	conventional	term	rendition	was	put	forward.	Unfortunately,	in	the	period	after	publication	of	the	first	edition	of	this	article,	the	term	rendition	took	on	tragic	connotations	of	political	torture	and	has	been	dropped	from	further	consideration.	Some	sources	refer	to	the	process	as	"prosumption".	Meanwhile,	Benkler’s	provocative	analysis	of	peer	production,	a.k.a.	coproduction,	in	the	voluntary	action	of	software	production	suggests	this	as	a	plausible	term	(which	covers	both	"services"	and	"service	delivery"	in	the	elementary,	basic	social	acts	of	producing	common	goods	(Benkler,	2002;	Benkler,	2006).	Coproduction	of	common	goods	is,	upon	close	examination,	quite	distinct	from	economic	production,	including	the	production	of	toll	goods.	In	fact,	coproduction	involves	a	process	of	simultaneous	"production"	and	"consumption".	It	is	also	a	central	fact	of	common	goods	production	that	they	cannot	be	inventoried,	warehoused	or	arbitraged,	for	the	simple	reason	that	their	"production"	and	"consumption"	are	not	only	collective	and	social	but	also	simultaneous.		Diverse	economic	and	noneconomic	sources	working	in	the	theoretical	no-man’s	land	of	common	goods	have	struggled	with	the	resultant	inapplicability	of	economic	dualisms	like	production	and	consumption	to	social	action.	Eagleton	(1976),	for	example,	speaks	of	"Literary	value	is	a	phenomenon	which	is	produced	(as	opposed	to	immanent)	in	.	.	.	that	"consumptional	production"	of	the	work	which	is	the	act	of	reading."	p.	166-167.	A	recent	trend	has	been	to	speak	of	the	"coproduction"	of	common	goods.	(Austin,	1981)	Overall,	it	seems	preferable	to	abandon	the	dualistic	language	of	production	entirely.		
 9 
Coproduction	of	common	goods	is,	upon	close	examination,	quite	distinct	from	economic	production	of	toll	goods,	private	goods	and	public	goods.	In	particular,	it	involves	symbolic	processes	which	blend	information	and	meaning--neither	of	which	adheres	to	ordinary	economic	assumptions	of	scarcity.	(Ilchman	and	Uphoff,	1968)	While	the	terms	information	and	meaning	are	often	used	interchangeably,	it	is	more	useful	for	our	purposes	to	distinguish	them	as	economic	commodities.	In	this,	we	follow	Edelman	(1971)	and	Moles	(1968),	who	have	made	a	clear	distinction	between	them.	Information	involves	communication	of	novelty,	freshness,	spontaneity	and	unpredictability	in	discretionary	situations.	When	an	astrophysicist	searching	for	the	edge	of	the	universe	makes	a	discovery,	or	when	a	performer	offers	a	new	interpretation	of	a	familiar	work	of	art,	or	a	social	worker	begins	working	with	a	new	client,	the	research	finding,	the	presentation	and	the	new	case	are	heavily	informational.	In	the	same	vein,	the	perspective	offered	here	will,	it	is	hoped,	be	informative	for	readers.	By	contrast,	meaning	addresses	the	certainty,	order,	redundancy	and	predictability	of	communication.	New	research	findings	must	be	placed	in	the	context	of	previous	research	to	be	understood.	Likewise,	the	artistic	presentation	is	judged	against	previous	interpretations	and	the	dramatic	script	or	musical	score,	and	client	problems	are	interpreted	within	a	body	of	established	practice	theory.	Meaning	used	in	this	way	comes	close	to	what	philosophers	of	science	address	as	a	paradigm.	(Bernstein,	1985)	Because	they	consist	of	information	and	meaning,	common	goods	are	symbolic	and	not	subject	to	either	economic	scarcity	or	physical	laws.	Furthermore,	the	peculiar	consumption	(or	extinction	of	value)	associated	with	acts	of	coproduction	is	never	entirely	complete	because	of	memories,	notes,	written	accounts	and	artifacts	and	other	meanings.		Any	fund	of	surviving	meanings	and	new	information	which	functions	as	a	resource	for	further	voluntary	action	will	be	termed	an	endowment.	Thus,	for	example,	the	pioneering	social	workers,	doctors,	nurses	and	others		who	built	up	an	initial	knowledge	base	out	of	their	practical	experience	in	the	early	days	of	the	HIV-AIDS	crisis	in	the	1980s	were	able	to	pass	that	endowment	on	to	others,	and	supplement	their	own	experience	with	research	results	as	they	were	published.	The	economics	of	commons	treats	money	as	a	symbolic	medium,	along	with	other	resource	endowments.	Money	is,	however,	only	one	of	the	media	of	the	commons.	One	process	with	important	consequences	for	the	economic	value	of	an	endowment	in	the	commons	involves	the	process	we	call	learning,	the	economic	importance	of	which	involves	taking	value	away	from	a	situation.	The	complementary	process	to	learning	is	technique,	which	is	one	of	two	forms	of	bringing	value	into	a	situation.	An	accumulated	set	of	learned	techniques	possessed	by	a	person	or	a	group	is	a	special	set	of	meanings	which	can	be	termed	a	repertory.	Thus,	founding	a	musical	or	theatre	group,	for	example	often	hinges	on	identifying	seasoned	performers	with	an	established	repertory	(of	both	written	scripts	and	acting	techniques)	able	to	act	upon	and	to	teach	others.	The	same	can	also	be	said	for	a	monastic	order,	an	athletic	team,	a	research	laboratory	or	other	knowledge	commons	(Hess	&	Ostrom,	2007).	Another	major	way	to	bring	economic	value	into	a	common	involves	search,	which	is	the	primary	way	in	which	information	is	brought	into	commons.	Philosophical	contemplation,	scientific	research,	artistic	creation	and	ordinary	information	gathering	from	news	reporting	to	archival	research	are	all	important	forms	of	search,	as	are	some	types	of	religious	activity,	not	merely	theological	research	but	also	pilgrimages,	retreats,	
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and	other	quests	for	more	profound	religious	experience,	and	some	types	of	(amateur)	athletic	activity	and	personal	training.		Because	of	the	characteristics	of	action,	information	and	meaning,	time	is	a	key	to	economic	measurement	in	the	commons.	It	is	also	problematic.	Commons	are	organized	in	elastic	time-space	units	which	can	be	called	events.	Sets	of	related	events	to	which	meanings	are	attached	can	be	called	situations	(Thomas	and	Thomas,	1928,	571-575).	Events	and	situations	are	not	physical;	they	are	socially	defined;	Rational	actors	in	the	commons	know	when	a	situation	has	begun	and	when	it	ends.	Thus	it	is,	for	instance,	that	a	million	people	can	simultaneously	gather	on	the	streets	of	Rio,	Miami	or	New	Orleans	for	a	Latin	American-style	carnival	and	thousands	of	people	will	simultaneously	know	that	it	is	time	to	leave	the	athletic	arena	or	stadium	"when	the	gun	goes	off."	The	temporal	and	spatial	elasticity	of	situations,	however,	has	proven	to	be	one	of	the	greatest	stumbling	blocks	for	conventional	economic	measurement	of	services	in	general,	and	common	goods	in	particular.		The	elasticity	of	situations	is	evident	in	many	coproduced	acts.	Some	common	goods	are	produced)	by	actors	in	the	commons	at	one	time,	but	only	attain	value	when	they	are	learned	by	others	at	another	time.	This	is	commonly	true,	for	example,	of	research	results.	The	concept	of	a	complex	act,	composed	of	a	series	of	discrete	but	related,	acts	is	useful	in	such	cases.	G.H.	Mead’s	(1937)	four-part	division	of	social	acts	is	useful	in	thinking	through:	Impulse,	Perception,	Manipulation	and	Consummation.	Although	separated	in	time,	the	presentation	of	research	findings	and	their	use	in	the	design	of	further	experiments	by	the	same	team	are	often	part	of	the	same	complex	acts.		The	social	acts	of	producing	common	goods	also	require	an	alternative	to	conventional	economic	individualism.	Coproduced	social	action,	whether	baptisms	and	weddings	ceremonies,	parades	and	festivals,	initiation	rites,	scientific	conferences	and	amateur	athletic	competitions	are	only	possible	as	collective	actions	by	persons	co-present	with	one	another.	(If	this	is	not	immediately	clear,	try	marrying	yourself	or	conduct	your	own	funeral!)	Note:	An	insight	related	to	this	that	came	late	to	the	theory	is	that	organized,	collective	voluntary	action	is	not	just	a	matter	of	associations.	Also	important	are	assemblies	–	gatherings	together	in	a	shared	location:	Ceremonies,	festivals,	parades,	conferences	and	meetings	and	amateur	athletic	events	(for	which	we	have	many	names	-	meets,	tournaments,	competitions,	and	others)	as	well	as	religious	gatherings	as	diverse	as	church	services	and	pilgrimages	(like	the	annual	haj)	all	include	examples	of	such	assemblies.	The	fact	that,	in	modern	culture	many	(perhaps	most)	types	of	voluntary	action	can	also	be	pursued	commercially	offers	interesting	evidence	of	the	existence	of	multiple	sectors.	We	can	see	this	with	reference	to	Figure	1	above:	A	professional	sporting	event	is	a	private	good,	while	a	ticketed	intercollegiate	sporting	event	(e.g.,	football,	basketball	or	other	“revenue	sports)	is	a	toll	good,	and	a	club	sport	event	for	which	no	admission	is	charged	is	a	common	good.	Examples	of	comparable	athletic	public	goods	are	few	and	far	between.		In	an	open	society	the	borders	between	the	commons	and	the	market	are	open	and	permeable	and	economic	actors	are	often	free	to	move	back	and	forth.	Important	in	this	regard	is	the	awareness	of	participants:	Rational	actors	who	move	from	toll	charging	
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nonprofit	“firms”	to	commercial	activity	or	to	common	goods	producing	situations	will	be	aware	of	their	changing	circumstances	–	as	will	their	associates	.		The	application	of	the	perfect	knowledge	assumption	to	the	commons	has	several	interesting	implications.	For	example,	it	provides	a	rational	basis	for	"membership"	and	legitimacy	in	the	commons.	Artists,	scientists,	philanthropists,	amateur	athletes	and	others	engaged	in	common	goods	production	who	have	"gone	commercial",	are	a	well-known	and	recognized	phenomenon	in	all	areas	of	voluntary	action.	In	this	vein,	rational	actors	engaged	in	acts	of	common	good	will	know	that	they	are	acting	outside	of	markets,	households	and	the	state	and	motivated	by	ends	other	than	profit.		In	the	case	of	the	commons,	"ends	other	than	profit"	(or,	more	precisely,	common	goods)	are	a	condition	of	admission	and	the	basis	for	continued	participation	in	the	commons.	Assuming	a	self-interested	posture	seeking	personal	gain	at	any	point	immediately	takes	a	consistent,	rational	actor	out	of	the	commons.	Thus,	a	scientist	guilty	of	fabricating	data	for	profit	or	career	advancement	may	suffer	various	forms	of	removal	from	that	particular	commons,	including	publicity,	sanctions,	expulsion	from	an	organization,	or	dismissal	from	an	appointment	or	position.	Defrocking,	excommunication,	suspension	and	probation	are	other	forms	of	such	removals.		Coproductions	are	of	at	least	two	general	types:	Discourse	is	the	use	of	complex	verbal	symbols	to	assert	things	through	a	process	of	successive	understanding	and	the	aggregation	of	separate	meanings	(Langer,	p.	96).	Much	of	the	action	of	the	commons	involves	talking,	conversation	and	social	interaction	(including	written	communication).	A	second	type	of	coproduction	can	be	termed	presentation.	(Langer,	p.	271)	It	involves	the	representation	or	dramatization	of	complex	images,	symbols,	and	other	types	of	'complex'	meanings	to	those	present	in	the	situation.	This	category	would	include	most	forms	of	religious	ritual	and	many	forms	of	'pure'	artistic	and	scientific	productions,	as	well	as	scientific	meetings	and	professional	conferences.	Amateur	athletic	events	are	presentations	with	a	large	meaning	component(rules,	techniques,	etc.)	and	small,	but	highly	significant	information	content	(who	won,	big	plays,	etc.).	Both	types	of	coproduction	are	economic	dramas--complex	social	acts	involving	pluralities	of	persons	and	incorporating	a	range	of	established	and	interdependent	role	definitions,	sometimes	mistakenly	called	"divisions	of	labor".		Note:	In	later	statements	of	the	theory,	four	types	of	performances	involved	in	coproduction	of	common	goods	are	identified:	These	are	termed	benefactories,	in	which	the	common	goods	produced	are	benefits	to	individuals	and	groups;	performatories,	which	produce	artistic,	musical	or	other	performances,	including	parades	and	festivals;		
celebratoria,	which	produce	celebrations	like	patriotic	observances,	birthdays,	religious	holidays;	and	moeuratoria,	like	non-governmental	standard	setting	organizations,	accrediting	bodies	which	produce	moeurs	(norms,	mores,	values,	rules,	standards	and	practices).	This	latter	term	comes	from	Alexis	de	Tocqueville’s	lesser	known	book,	The	Old	
Regime	and	the	Revolution.		Important	economic	roles	in	the	commons,	for	example,	include	patrons,	who	obtain	or	provide	material	and	symbolic	resources.	Institutions	of	patronage	and	other	features	of	the	commons	can	be	found	coexisting	with	markets	in	most	of	the	worlds	historical	and	
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contemporary	cultures	including	Ancient	Greece	and	Rome,	medieval	Europe,	Indoamerica,	and	the	major	cultures	of	Asia	and	the	Middle	East.	(Finlay,	1974;	James,	1987;)		In	commons,	patrons	are	not	just	those	who	give	money,	but	also	those	who	give	other	meanings.	The	benefactor	and	the	composer	of	sacred	music	thus	share	a	common	status	as	patrons.	Patrons	typically	operate	from	a	complex	of	motives	and	derive	a	range	of	economic	and	noneconomic	value	from	their	acts.	Also,	there	are	the	clients,	audiences	and	publics	who	are	the	objects	of	the	economic	dramas	of	the	commons.	In	between	are	the	agents	and	performers	who	enact	dramas	of	common	goods.	In	later	versions	of	the	theory,	notably	Lohmann	(2015),	these	patrons	and	donors,	intermediaries	and	clients	and	said	to	constitute	the	characteristic	triadic	exchange	of	commons	goods	production,	termed	the	philanthropod.	Such	exchanges	are	said	to	constitute	the	organization	of	common	goods	production	and	are	characterized	by	1)	voluntary	participation;	2)	shared	purposes	or	
mission;	and	3)	shared	or	common	pool	resources.	Two	additional	characteristics	are	said	to	emerge	from	participation	in	commons:	4)	filia,	or	a	sense	of	mutuality	or	social	capital;	and	5)	daikon,	or	an	innate	sense	of	fairness	toward	one	another	(Lohmann,	1992).		Together,	such	philanthrods	of	patrons,	agents	and	focused	publics	define	commons	capable	autonomy	or	independence;	that	is	both	of	self-organization	or	self-constitution	and	self-governance.	Much	of	common	goods	economics	is	concerned	with	the	appropriate	basis	of	support	of	agents	and	performers	by	patrons,	and	the	nondistribution	clause	of	nonprofit	corporate	law	and	Hansmann's	"contract	failure"	are	important	insights	for	common	goods	theory	into	perceived	problems.	Similar	assurances	for	various	clients,	audiences	and	publics	about	the	responsible	behavior	of	agents	and	performers,	however,	are	even	more	problematic.	The	fundamental	problem,	however,	is	identifying	the	basis	of	economic	value	of	common	goods.	
Values In the Commons It	is	possible,	on	the	basis	of	the	above,	to	tentatively	set	forth	some	value	premises	which	model	at	least	partly,	the	empirical	world	of	voluntary	action.	Because	the	coproduction	of	common	goods	is	a	process	of	symbolic	interaction	rather	than	material	fabrication,	the	pattern	of	role	assignments	can	be	seen	as	the	ultimate	basis	of	the	economic	value	of	common	goods.	While	the	study	of	other,	noneconomic	aspects	of	role	definition	in	the	independent	sector	is	relatively	advanced,	little	attention	has	been	given	to	the	manner	in	which	actors	assuming	appropriate	roles	also	initiate	the	complex	patterns	of	learning,	search	and	technique	by	which	economic	values	are	created	and	sustained.		In	fact,	this	process	is	so	central,	that	we	can	speak	of	the	role-taking	theory	of	value	as	basic	to	the	commons.	Common	goods	are	of	value	to	actors	in	the	commons	because	they	are	of	value	to	others	in	the	commons	who	are	of	value	to	them.		This	leads	also	to	what	might	be	called	the	principle	of	economic	ethnocentrism:	Because	economic	value	arises	within	commons	and	is	an	inherent	part	of	larger	clusters	of	information	and	meaning,	evaluation	of	common	goods	must	occur	within	the	commons	on	the	basis	of	those	values	which	arise	there.	It	is	not	reasonable	or	consistent	to	take	values	and	standards	from	another	context	and	superimpose	them	upon	groups	operating	in	the	commons.	This	ethnocentric	principle	is	greatly	threatened	by	present	trends	in	nonprofit	
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economics,	in	which	the	moeurs	of	one	common	–	professional	economists	–	are	being	inappropriately	imposed	upon	a	wide	range	of	other	commons	in	the	name	of	scientific	neutrality	and	objectivity.		An	unexpected	corollary	of	the	perfect	knowledge	assumption	above	is	the	affluence	assumption	of	self-interest	operative	in	the	commons,	which	can	be	stated	thus:	Based	upon	widely	articulated	standards	by	Adam	Smith,	Hannah	Arendt	and	Jurgen	Habermas,	among	others,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	only	individuals	who	have	currently	met	their	basic	needs	for	survival	and	reproduction	(e.g.,	those	who	are	not	facing	imminent	starvation	or	threat	of	death)	will	enter	or	remain	in	the	commons.	Consistently	rational	participants	in	the	commons	whose	basic	needs	have	been	met	in	this	baseline	sense	will,	as	a	result,	have	no	rational	basis	to	prefer	pursuit	of	personal	gain	or	profit	over	other	objectives.	If	they	chose	to	do	so	as	a	discretionary	act,	they	violate	the	most	fundamental	moeurs	of	participation	and	necessarily	remove	themselves	from	the	moral	authority	of	the	commons.	This	is	consistent	with	the	nondistribution	clause	found	in	all	nonprofit	corporation	statutes,	and	its	associated	legal	and	ethical	traditions.	If	they	continue	to	nominally	participate	in	common	with	others	they	do	so	inauthentically.		An	equally	important	corollary	is	that	profit	maximization	as	a	criterion	or	standard	of	rational	action	is	inoperative	in	the	commons.	Authentic	actors	who	have	not	entered	or	remain	in	the	commons	under	false	pretense	will	simply	have	no	utility	to	calculate	or	to	maximize.	This	non-calculation	posture	has	both	a	theoretical	and	a	methodological	dimension.	See	Boettke	&	Prychitko	[2005]	for	further	discussion	of	this	point.	This	is	a	result	both	of	the	affluence	assumption	and	the	formal,	content-empty	status	of	utility	in	modern	economic	theory.	Since	Edgeworth,	economists	have	held	that	utility	is	a	formal	concept	without	subjective	meaning--a	construct	of	market	behavior,	devoid	of	any	of	the	earlier	'subjective'	connotations	of	happiness	or	pleasure;	possessed	of	no	meaning	beyond	its	operational	definition.	To	the	extent	that	utility	is	a	purely	formal	characteristic	of	market	behavior,	then	actors	in	situations	explicitly	defined	as	nonmarket	and	nonprofit	can	hardly	be	expected	to	be	capable	of	calculating	utility.	Can	a	nonutilitarian	economics	exist	without	either	maximization	or	utility?	How	is	it	possible	to	summarize	the	diverse	values	and	ends	of	actors	in	commons	without	resort	to	these	concepts?	First,	the	possibility	must	be	acknowledged	that,	indeed,	there	may	be	no	single	universal	standard	to	summarize	motives	and	ends	in	commons	even	though	in	the	western	tradition,	terms	like	happiness,	pleasure,	actualization,	satiation,	welfare,	health	and	utility	are	all	commonly	used	for	this	purpose.	Steinberg,	for	one,	is	forthrightly	skeptical	about	whether	there	can	be	a	general,	formal,	theoretical	objective	in	the	commons.	He	says:	"Although	the	lack	of	a	profit	motive	allows	nonprofits	to	provide	needed	social	services	in	a	trustworthy	fashion,	it	also	fosters	inefficiency.	But	there	can	be	no	monolithic	theory	of	nonprofit	behavior,	for	the	forces	of	competition	and	regulation	are	paramount--the	functioning	of	each	non-profit	organization	depends	on	the	level	of	competition	by	government,	for-profit	firms,	and	other	nonprofits"	(Steinberg,	1987,	p.	134).	Whether	or	not	there	is	such	a	universal	standard,	however,	for	at	least	some	common	goods,	rational	choice	appears	to	be	guided	by	a	nonutilitarian	criterion	which	has	been	
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called	satisfaction.	An	alternative	is	said	to	be	satisfactory	if:	1)	there	exists	a	set	of	agreed-upon	criteria	that	describe	minimally	satisfactory	alternatives;	and	2)	the	alternative	in	question	is	agreed	to	meet	or	exceed	all	of	these	criteria	in	the	view	of	the	decision-makers.	(March	and	Simon,	1958.	p.140)	Note	that	the	first	of	these	criteria	conforms	closely	to	a	meaning	as	noted	above,	while	determination	of	the	second	would	introduce	new	information	into	the	situation.	Satisfaction,	in	this	sense,	is	not	a	utilitarian	counting	principle,	and	not	to	be	confused	with	anything	like	a	utilitarian	pleasure-pain	calculus.	It	is,	instead,	itself	an	act;	an	observable	moment	or	event	in	the	interaction	of	members	of	the	commons.	Thus,	satisfaction	is	attained	when	search	is	suspended	and	technique	and	attention	are	shifted	elsewhere.	Exactly	this	criterion	may	be	observed	in	the	governance	of	many	associations.	One	suspects	that	this	"attention	shift"	is	such	a	universally	observable	phenomenon	that	it	is	simply	taken	for	granted	by	most	observers	and	participants	in	commons.	Simon	and	March	(1958)	and	Braybrooke	and	Lindblom	(1963)	are	among	the	observers	who	have	noted	aspects	of	its	significance.	In	the	commons,	choice	seldom	involves	exact	calculation	or	precise	predictions.	Instead,	when	consensus	is	reached	that	an	agreed	upon	satisfactory	objective	has	been	realized,	discourse	simply	shifts	to	another	topic.	Such	satisfaction	is	the	primary	criterion	of	rational	choice	in	the	commons,	and	governs	economic	decisions	there	as	well.	By	itself,	however,	satisfaction	only	operates	as	a	"termination	rule",	telling	us	when	it	is	rational	to	end	planning	and	pre-decision	discussion.	It	says	nothing	about	the	distributive	rationality	of	common	goods	which	may	occur	as	a	result.	However,	satisfaction	often	occurs	concurrently	with	another	fundamental	principle	of	distribution	in	the	commons.	That	criterion	is	proportion,	and	occurs	in	a	situation	when	no	rational	actor	with	standing	to	do	so	will	act	to	gain	additional	resources	except	from	endowments	of	uncommitted	resources.	In	the	commons,	proportion	is	almost	always	a	preferred	alternative	to	Pareto	optimality	for	settling	issues	of	distribution.	The	criterion	of	Pareto	optimality,	which	is	often	also	referred	to	as	an	"efficiency"	measure,	suggests	that	a	decision	is	optimal	if	no	one	loses	and	at	least	one	person	gains.	This	standard,	although	sometimes	uncritically	embraced,	has	never	lacked	for	critics.	For	example,	Sen	says	"there	is	a	danger	in	being	exclusively	concerned	with	Pareto-optimality.	An	economy	can	be	optimal	in	this	sense	even	when	some	people	are	rolling	in	luxury	and	others	are	near	starvation	as	long	as	the	starvers	cannot	be	made	better	off	without	cutting	into	the	pleasures	of	the	rich.	If	preventing	the	burning	of	Rome	would	have	made	Emperor	Nero	feel	worse	off,	then	letting	him	burn	Rome	would	have	been	Pareto-optimal.	In	short,	a	society	or	economy	can	be	Pareto-optimal	and	still	be	perfectly	disgusting."	(p.	22)	Taken	together,	these	criteria	offer	the	beginning	of	an	economic	value	theory	appropriate	to	the	analysis	of	common	goods.	Thus,	it	would	appear	that	analysis	of	real	allocations	of	common	goods	is	primarily	a	logical,	rather	than	a	calculative,	process.	Thus,	much	of	the	apparatus	of	economic	analysis	has	little	to	offer	the	study	of	common	goods.	Not	only	does	the	isomorphism	of	the	conventional	economic	production	model	not	apply,	as	has	been	suggested.	One	seldom	finds	actual	actors	in	the	commons,	past	or	present,	engaged	in	detailed	mathematical	analysis	of	their	alternatives.	Thus,	there	are	real	and	important	indications	that	common	goods	economics	must,	in	fact,	be	
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nonquantitative.	It	could	be	argued,	for	example,	that	economics	of	common	goods	is,	most	appropriately	seen	as	a	branch	of	interdisciplinary	collective	choice	theory.	If	so,	the	methods	of	modern	symbolic	logic	may	be	more	suitable	than	calculus	and	indifference	curves	as	a	basis	of	analysis	of	common	goods.		
Conclusion 
It is possible to identify a rational choice model which bears some resemblance to 
actual nonprofit settings and identifies a set of standards and criteria for evaluating 
choices in those settings. Common goods, or endowment theory appears to offer a 
way to approach the allocation of resources in the nonprofit sector which respects 
the integrity of voluntary action without inappropriately reducing such action to the 
categories of the market place. Moreover, it is highly probable that many of the 
most interesting and provocative findings of nonprofit economics can be 
incorporated and also stated positively in endowment theory.  
Regardless, the economics of the voluntary sector need not be treated exclusively 
as a series of negations. Positive statements can be made about collective action in 
the commons, just as they can about economic action in the market, state and 
household. The most fundamental of these is that actors in the commons need not 
be held to the standards of buyers and sellers in order for their behavior to be 
treated as economically rational. To do so is to fall victim to the limits of the same 
inappropriate classification whereby lettuce is nonanimal. 
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